"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake"
- Napoleon Bonaparte
Digest of Imp Case Laws (Jan - April 2013)CIT vs. Textool Co. Ltd (Supreme Court)
While it is true that a fiscal statute has to be construed strictly and nothing should be added to or subtracted from it, yet a strict construction of a provision does not rule out the application of the principles of reasonable construction to give effect to the purpose and intention of any particular provision of the Act. From a bare reading of s. 36(1)(v), it is manifest that the real intention behind the provision is that the employer should not have any control over the funds of the irrevocable trust created exclusively for the benefit of the employees. On facts, it is evident that the assessee had absolutely no control over the fund created by the LIC for the benefit of the employees of the assessee and further all the contribution made by the
assessee in the said fund ultimately came back to the Textool Employees Gratuity Fund, approved by the CIT. Thus, the conditions stipulated in s. 36(1)(v) were satisfied
CIT vs. Silver Oak Laboratories P. Ltd (Supreme Court)
On examining the terms and conditions, invoices, purchase orders and challans indicating payment of excise duty, there is no material on record to indicate that the transaction in question is a “contract for carrying out works“. Hence, s. 194C is not attracted. S. 194C has been amended by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 1.10.2009 to provide that “work” includes manufacturing or supplying a product according to the requirement or specification of a customer by using material purchased from such customer. It is clarified that the definition of the word “work” will not include manufacturing or supplying a product according to the requirement or specification of a customer by using material purchased from a person other than such customer
G. E. Veerabhadrappa vs. UOI (Central Administrative Tribunal)
As regards the allegation that the removal was motivated by “malice and personal vendetta“, the exchange of correspondence between the President and the Law Ministry regarding the transfers of the Members took place after the passing of the order dated 5.5.2012 curtailing the tenure of the Applicant till 31.8.2012. There is some merit in the contention of the Respondents that the Applicant is trying to create a “smoke screen” by unnecessarily dragging the names of the Law Secretaries and making personal allegations
Mindtree Limited vs. UOI (Karnataka High Court)
Firstly, it is the settled position of law that every tax exemption should have a sunset clause. As the exemption in s. 115JB(6) & 115-O(6) did not have a sunset clause, the flaw is removed by the impugned amendment. Secondly, the exemption created an inequality between SEZ companies and other companies which is now removed. Thirdly, the exemptions provided to SEZ companies resulted in erosion of tax base. Fourthly, the impugned amendment relates to fiscal policy of the state and any decision in the economic sphere is adhoc and experimental in its nature and the Government is well within it sovereign power to regulate the same. Lastly, the impugned amendments do not transgress any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution. The legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative power by resort to the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. Since it is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when equity so requires. The courts would decline to enforce this doctrine if it results in great hardship to government and would be prejudicial to the public interest
CIT vs. Nike Inc (Karnataka High Court)
U/s 9(1)(i) income accruing or arising from any “business connection” in India is deemed to accrue or arise in India. The expression “business connection” is defined in Explanation 2 to s. 9 to include any business activities carried out by a person who is habitually acting on behalf of the non-resident in India. However, this does not include an authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the non-resident if the activities are limited to the purchase of the goods or merchandise for the non-resident. Under Explanation 1(b) to s. 9(1)(e) a non-resident is not liable to tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even if the non-resident has an office or agency in India for that purpose and the goods are subjected by him to any manufacturing process before being exported from India. The result is that no income is deemed to accrue or arise in India to a non-resident, whether directly or indirectly through or from any “business connection“, if the activities are confined for the purpose of export
Fateh Chand Charitable Trust vs. CIT (Allahabad High Court)
It is a shocking to note that as a matter of fact, the said assessment order is no assessment order in the eyes of law. There is not even a whisper with regard to the receipt of donation of Rs. 1.57 crore. It is really not understandable under what circumstances the said assessment order came into existence. The assessment order is bereft of any discussion with regard to the genuineness of the donation given or the creditworthiness of the donor to part with such a huge amount. It is also shocking to note that the CIT passed an order dropping the proceedings for cancellation of registration without assigning any reason. One fails to understand what impelled him to do so. The order being bereft of any reason is no order in the eyes of law and is liable to be ignored being illegal and void. The income tax authorities are required to administer the Act. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to mal-administer. Thus, we find no words to express anguish as what kind of governance it had been. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. It is a case where the AO, the Addl. CIT and the CIT have abdicated their duties. The Court in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be a mute spectator. Such actions on the part of the department not only bring disrepute to the department but also encourages the dishonest assessees and promotes the nefarious activities which not only causes loss to revenue but also promotes dishonestly. An honest tax payer feels cheated. Let the matter be examined by the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax and appropriate departmental proceedings may be taken out against the erring officials. A copy of this judgment may also be sent to the Chairman of the CBDT for appropriate action
Y. P. Trivedi vs. JCIT (ITAT Mumbai)
The facts do not suggest that the assessee has acted in a malafide manner or that the reasons explained are only a device to cover an ulterior purpose. It is a settled proposition of law that Courts should take a lenient view on the matter of condonation of delay provided the explanation and the reason for delay is bonafide and not merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The Court should be liberal in construing sufficient cause and should lean in favour of such party. Whenever substantial Justice and technical considerations are opposed to each other, cause of substantial Justice has to be preferred. On facts, the reasons explained by the assessee show that due to bonafide mistake and inadvertence, the appeal could not be filed within the period of limitation. Accordingly, the delay of 496 days has to be condoned (Mst. Katiji 167 ITR 471(SC) referred)
Apollo Tyres Ltd vs. DCIT (ITAT Cochin)
A combined reading of s. 201(1A) and s. 40(a)(ia) shows that while a case of short-deduction of TDS is covered by s. 201(1A), it is not covered by s. 40(a)(ia). There is an obvious omission to include short deduction / lesser deduction in s. 40(a)(ia). Therefore, in case of short /lesser deduction of tax, the entire expenditure whose genuineness was not doubted by the assessing officer, cannot be disallowed (S.K. Tekriwal (Cal HC) & Chandabhoy and Jassobhoy 49 SOT 448 (Mum) followed)
Vijai Electricals Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Hyderabad)
An amount paid for investment in share capital of subsidiaries outside India is not in the nature of an “international transaction” as defined in s. 92-B. Transfer pricing provisions are not applicable to transactions where there is no income (Circular No. 14, dated 22/11/2011, Dana Corporation 321 ITR 178 (AAR) & Amiantit International 322 ITR 678 (AAR) referred)
In Re Castleton Investment Ltd (AAR)
The theory of precedents does not have strict application to the AAR. It is bound only by the decisions of the Supreme Court. The decisions of High Courts have only persuasive value. The AAR is not subordinate to any High Court for even Article 227 of the Constitution to apply and there are grave doubts whether the jurisdiction under Article 226 will be attracted to the AAR. While the AAR should be slow in disagreeing with propositions of law laid down in earlier rulings, it should not be deterred from taking a contrary view if it is convinced that the earlier view is not correct
In Re Orient Green Power Pte. Ltd (AAR)
U/s 82 of the Companies Act, shares in a company is moveable property transferable in the manner provided by its Articles of Association. The applicant has not shown the gift was authorized by its Articles. It is difficult to imagine the Articles of Association of a company providing for gifting away of the assets in the form of shares in another company by what is attempted to be described as oral gift. A “gift” by one company to another company of shares in a public company appears to be strange, unless it be one which has been set up for some purpose. The revenue’s contention that the purpose of the gift is to avoid tax and s. 56(2)(viia) is not far-fetched. Also, s. 47(i) & (iii) appear to apply to gifts by individuals and HUFs and not by companies. The Authority has the right & the duty to consider the reality of the transaction and genuineness of the transaction, in addition to its validity. When such transactions are entered into involving substantial assets the applicant has to prove to the hilt the factum, genuineness and validity of the transaction, the right to enter into the transaction and the bona fides of the transaction. To postulate that a corporation can give away its assets free to another even orally can only be aiding dubious attempts at avoidance of tax payable under the Act. The AO is in a batter position to make a proper enquiry into the question of the genuineness and validity of the transaction. Hence, a ruling is declined
In Re Aramex International Logistics Pvt Ltd (AAR)
A “permanent establishment” is something which enables a non-resident to carry on a part of its whole business in a particular country. The Aramex group could not have done business in India without a presence in India. This presence in India can be achieved through an independent entity or through a subsidiary. If the entity is an independent & uncontrolled entity, then there is no PE if the requirements in Article 5(2) of the DTAC are not satisfied. However, if a 100% subsidiary is created for the purpose of attending to the business of the group, the subsidiary must be taken to be a PE of the group in India applying common sense
(This is the scanned version of the printed Board, signed by the Assistant Registrar, and so it is as reliable as it can get)
