Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. UOI (Supreme Court)

The High Court’s finding that, applying the “nature and character of the transaction� test, the transfer of the CGP share was not adequate in itself to achieve the object of consummating the transaction between HTIL and VIH and that there was a transfer of other “rights and entitlements� which were “capital assets� is not correct because the transaction was one of “share sale� and not an “asset sale�. It had to be viewed from a commercial and realistic perspective. As it was not a case of sale of assets on itemized basis, the entire structure, as it existed, ought to have been looked at holistically. A transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel cannot be broken up into separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. The sum of US$ 11.08 bn was paid for the “entire package� and it was not permissible to split the payment and consider a part of it towards individual items (Mugneeram Bangur 57 ITR 299 (SC) followed)

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Dell Products vs. State (Supreme Court, Norway)

Article 5(5) of the DTAA provides that “when a person, not an independent status to whom paragraph 6 applies, acting on behalf of an enterprise and has and habitually exercises in a Contracting State authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in that State for any activities which that person undertakes for the enterprise.” There is no dispute that Dell AS is not an independent agent. The expressions “on behalf” and “have authority to conclude contracts on behalf of” in Article 5(5) mean that the contracts must be legally binding. These expressions must be given their normal meaning as per the Vienna Convention. This is also supported by the Commentary on the OECD Model Convention on which the DTAA is based. A similar view has been taken by the Conseil d’Etat of France in Zimmer (included with the Appeal Court’s order). As the language of the Article is clear, it is not possible to adopt the “functional approachâ€� proposed by the Revenue. Consequently, Dell Products does not have permanent establishment in Norway

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CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd (Supreme Court)

Having heard learned counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have dismissed the appeals without considering the following questions, which, according to us, did arise for consideration. They are formulated as under … (C) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in holding that sales tax incentive is a Capital Receipt?” Accordingly, the civil appeals are allowed, impugned orders are set aside and the cases are remitted to the High Court to decide the questions, formulated above, in accordance with law.”

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Alpine Electronics Asia Pte Ltd vs. DGIT (Delhi High Court)

The service of notice u/s 143(2) within the statutory time limit is mandatory and is not an inconsequential procedural requirement. Omission to issue notice u/s 143(2) is not curable and the requirement cannot be dispensed with. S. 143(2) is applicable to proceedings u/s 147 & 148. While the Proviso to s. 148 protects and grants liberty to the Revenue to serve notice u/s 143(2) before passing of the assessment order for returns furnished on or before 1.10.2005, in respect of returns filed pursuant to notice u/s 148 after 1.10.2005, it is mandatory to serve notice u/s 143(2) within the stipulated time limit (Hotel Blue Moon 321 ITR 362 (SC) referred)

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Dinesh Chandra Agarwal vs. UOI (Allahabad High Court)

Though, prima facie, the Rule appears to be a correct notification supposedly issued in public interest in line with the rules and practice clamping ban on the legal practice by the retired judges of High Court in the courts where they remain posted as permanent judge and the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court, however, it appears to be offensive in two respects; namely, that the retired members have been completely barred from practice before the Tribunal, and secondly, that the aforesaid rule 13E has been interpreted to apply retrospectively in the judgment rendered in the case of Concept Creations vs. ACIT 120 ITD 19 (Delhi) (Special Bench) by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi, beyond its pale of competence as it has the jurisdiction to decide only the matters relating to tax appeals as contained in the Income Tax Act vide Sections 253 and 254 thereof

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Doshion Ltd vs. ITO (Gujarat High Court)

The fact that by virtue of the Explanation to s. 80IA added with retrospective effect from 1.4.2000, income derived from the works contract would not qualify for deduction u/s 80IA does not mean that an assessment can be reopened beyond 4 years without there being any failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts (Sadbhav Engineering 333 ITR 483(Guj) followed)

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Chadha Sugars Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Delhi)

In view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court which held the field when the return was filed, the claim was patently disallowable. The claim was also not discernible on the face of the record and the details of expenses had to be gone into in order to decipher the claim. The argument that the assessee does not have expertise in taxation matters and so it relied on expert opinion is not acceptable because the opinion was not furnished for accounting purposes. An accountant’s view is not really material for deciding the deductibility or otherwise of an expenditure. The assessee knew about the problem at the time of filing of return, but still made the claim. Not only this, the claim was pursued even up to the level of the CIT (A) in gross disregard for the decision of the Supreme Court, which the assessee came to know at least after receiving the assessment order. Therefore, the claim was not only wrong but also false and it was persisted with for some time. The fact that the assessee did not even seek explanation from the tax auditor or the CA gave the impression that the whole thing was a sham.

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P.V. Ramana Reddy vs. ITO (ITAT Hyderabad)

Though the assessee owned the unaccounted transactions only after search action, when an assessee admits his mistake and that he has committed a wrong and offers the additional income to tax, it cannot be said that his statement is false or not bona fide. Neither the CIT (A) nor the Tribunal were completely clear about the exact amount of concealment and there was no conclusive evidence as some additions had been deleted. S. 271(1)(c) gives discretion to the AO to exonerate the assessee from levy of penalty even in case where the assessee has concealed the income or furnished incorrect particulars of income. Penalty should not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. The AO has to exercise his discretion judiciously. If an assessee files a revised return though at a later stage or discloses true income, penalty need not be levied. No doubt, merely offering additional income will not automatically protect the assessee from levy of penalty but in a given case where the assessee came forward with additional income though after detection because he was not in a position to explain the seized material properly and expresses remorse in his conduct un-hesitantly, the AO has to exercise the discretion in favour of such assessee as otherwise the expression ‘may’ in s. 271(1)(c) becomes redundant. In a case of admitted income, concealment penalty is not automatic. The discretion vested in the AO should be used not to levy penalty. On facts, the case was most befitting to exercise such discretion because there was divergent opinion while deleting or sustaining the addition and there was no conclusive proof that the assessee concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The assessee’s offer was to avoid litigation. If the AO had clinching evidence of concealment, he should not have accepted the assessee’s offer and should have proceeded on the basis of material on record (VIP Industries 112 TTJ 289, Siddharth Enterprises 184 TM 460 (P&H) & Reliance Petro Products 322 ITR 158 (SC) followed)

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Demag Cranes & Components (India) vs. DCIT (ITAT Pune)

Rule 10B(e)(iii) provides that “the profit margin arising in comparable uncontrolled transactions has to be adjusted to take into account the differences, if any between the international transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market“. While the “differences” are not specified, it covers “any differences” which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin. The litmus test to be applied is if the ‘difference, if any, is capable of affecting the NPM in open market? If yes, then the TPO is under statutory obligation to eliminate such differences. The revenue cannot say that difference is likely to exist in all accounts and so the demands of the assessee should be ignored. The revenue’s stand that the assessee is ineligible for any adjustments if he provides the set of comparable is not correct because under Rule 10(3) it is the duty of the AO/TPO/DRP to minimize/eliminate the difference which is likely to materially affect the price. It is the settled proposition that ‘working capital’ adjustment is an adjustment that is required to be made in TNMM. The revenue’s contention that the ‘differences’ specified should refer to only (i) the factor of demand and supply; (ii) existence of marketable intangibles i.e. brand name etc; (iii) geographical location and the like is not acceptable. Further, as the difference in the Arm’s length Operating Margin of the Comparables before and after making the adjustment for working capital was up to 3.77%, it was “material” and had to be eliminated (Mentor Graphics 109 ITD 101 (Del), E-gain Communication 118 ITD 243 (Pune) Sony India 114 ITD 448 (Del) & TNT India followed)

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Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd In Re (AAR)

The argument that the pendency of the question in the case of the recipient cannot bar the application in the case of the payer is not acceptable because an “advance ruling� is a determination in relation to a “transaction�. A “transaction� always involves the payer and payee. It is not possible to separate an applicant from a transaction while he is seeking a Ruling, since the Ruling relates to a transaction undertaken by him or to be undertaken by him. A ruling also cannot be divorced from a transaction. The question posed before the income-tax authorities in the case of the recipient and before the AAR in the case of the payer is the same, namely, whether the income is assessable to tax. Consequently, the bar in s. 245R(2) applies and the payer’s application is not maintainable. The contrary view taken by the AAR in Airports Authority of India In re 168 Taxman 158 is not correct (Foster (AAR No. 975 of 2009) followed)

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In Re Groupe Industrial Marcel Dassault (AAR)

On facts, the French company’s (ShanH) only asset were the shares in the Indian company & it had no other business. When its shares were sold, what really passes were the underlying assets and the control of the Indian company. A gain was generated by the transaction. If the transaction is accepted at face value, control over Indian assets and business can pass from hand to hand without incurring any liability to tax in India. Such transactions have to be treated as ineffectual. It is not necessary to ignore the existence of ShanH to come to a conclusion that what is put up is a facade in the context of the tax law and would amount to a scheme for avoidance of tax

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In Re Millennium IT Software Ltd (AAR)

S. 9(1)(vi) & Article 12 define the term “royalty” to include any payment for the use of, or the right to use, a “copyright” of scientific work. Software programmes are a “copyright” and are protected under the Copyright Act, 1957. As the software programme is a “copyright”, any payment received for transferring the right to use it is “royalty” as defined in the Act. The argument that there is a distinction between a “copyright” and a “copyrighted article” is not acceptable because there is no such distinction made either in the Income-tax Act or the Copyright Act. The use of software involves the use of the copyright; the software cannot be divorced from the copyright itself. Accordingly, even a fee for the use of a “copyrighted article” is assessable as “royalty”. (Microsoft/Gracemac 42 SOT 550 (Del) followed; Dassault Systems 322 ITR 125 (AAR) not followed; Tata Consultancy 271 ITR 401 (SC) distinguished)

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